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The current wave of volatile international oil prices coupled with the low hydro-
energy generation continues to exert negative impacts on the Ugandan 
economy. This paper analyses the extent to which changes in energy prices 
affect the economy and examines policy options that can be undertaken to 
circumvent the negative effects. The impact of higher oil prices takes a large toll 
on all sectors including agriculture, manufacturing and services. With the existing 
losses in productivity of generating hydro electricity, this has exacerbated the 
energy crisis. The combined output loss for the manufacturing sector due to 
increase in fuel prices and a shortage of electricity is estimated at 2 per cent on 
annual basis. While the government has little control on the international prices of 
oil, further private and public investments in the energy sector are called for to 







The impact of oil shocks on national economies has been of concern to many 
countries, as a constraint to economic development. Recently, international oil 
prices have risen sharply and reached record levels, and coupled with Uganda’s 
reliance on oil imports, this has had an adverse impact on the country’s 
economy. Although this is not limited to Uganda, the country’s location and the 
recent natural and regional problems make it even more vulnerable to oil shocks. 
 
Uganda has neither crude oil production nor a refinery and is entirely dependent 
on imports of petroleum products, although it has recently discovered some oil 
reserves in the western region of the country. With recent power shortages in the 
country (resulting from reduced electricity generation from the only two power 
stations), and a hike in global oil prices, there has been an increase in the oil 
imports especially diesel for thermal power generation. According to government 
statistics, Uganda consumed about 792,555m3 of petroleum products in 2006. Of 
the total, 28.5 per cent by volume was diesel, 25 per cent gasoline, 11.4 per cent 
aviation fuel, 5.4 per cent kerosene, and 1 per cent LPG (UBOS, 2007; Figure 1). 
 
The increase in oil prices and reduced generation of electricity has had both 
direct and indirect effects on the economy. First, the reduction in electricity 
generation has significantly affected the manufacturing sector. This is due to the 
unexpected power outages and load shedding. In some cases companies have 
resorted to use of generators, albeit the increasing international prices of oil. This 
has resulted into lost output and in some instances bankruptcies. Increasing fuel 
prices have weighed heavily on the transportation sector while at the same time 
increasing the cost of generating thermal power.  
 
Given that there are short and long-term implications of volatile fuel prices, we 
use a dynamic general equilibrium model to capture the effects especially at a 
sectoral level. For oil prices, we first assume that the increase is permanent, a 2 
 
phenomenon which reflects what is on the ground in Uganda. The second 
simulation assumes that the oil prices revert back to their original levels in line 
with the international crude oil prices. The third simulation focuses on the marked 
reduction in electricity generated owing to the inefficiencies in the sector and the 
natural causes like the reduction of the water level of Lake Victoria. The fourth 
simulation assumes that the inefficiency in the utility sector is temporary and 
addressed by attracting private investments.  Lastly, we explore the case where 
the government reduces tariffs on oil imports to circumvent the price increase.  
 
The key results suggest that the changes in oil prices have sizable negative 
effects especially at the sectoral level. While at the aggregate level, GDP might 
not be affected as more activity is realised in the trading sector, increase in oil 
prices would significantly reduce the output for agriculture, manufacturing and 
transports. The reduction in output for these sectors is subdued when the oil 
price shock is temporary. On the other hand, the low efficiency in the electricity 
sector has also negatively affected the sectors. The combined effects of oil price 
shocks and reduction in electricity generated would reduce overall growth rate of 
the manufacturing sector by 2 per centage points on annual basis.  
 
This paper has some policy implications. First, at a time of high oil prices, the 
government can intervene by lowering tariffs on oil products. However, this has 
to take into account the trade-off between the oil tariff revenues and taxes lost 
owing to reduced economic activity especially in the manufacturing sector. 
Second, the government should take a more active role on suppliers where 
prices should be adjusted downwards when international prices drop. As found, 
the output losses are much higher when the price increase remains permanent. 
Third, without addressing the inefficiencies in the electricity sector, this will 
continue to affect the output of manufacturing and other sectors that depend on 
electricity. More private-public investments should be encouraged to enhance the 





B.1  Volatility of World Crude Oil Prices  
 
 On average, the international spot prices of crude oil jumped from an annual 
average of $12 per barrel in 1998 to $94 in 2008, a phenomenal 780% increase 
in just 10 years (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2008). Among factors 
that contributed to the hike was an unabated strong demand in the emerging 
economies and continuous tension in Middle-East region, the largest oil 
supplying region. Speculations on oil prices in future markets also played an 
important part in the price hikes, even though the supply seems to increase 
proportionally to meet demand in the last few years. Recently, the prices have 
been on a downward trend owing to the ongoing recession in the US and other 
developed countries. Various studies have suggested that any US$10 increase in 
oil price per barrel would cause about 1 per cent reduction in the world’s gross 
national product (GDP) and a 0.6 per cent increase in the world price.  
 
As far as Uganda is concerned, the component of retail prices of oil was 
demystified and its one-off affects on the economy can be explored. The spiral of 
higher oil prices has driven retail prices to record highs. The Government has 
made it clear to the market and consumers that there is nothing it can do to 
respond to the oil shocks. The entire dependence of the country on oil imports 
and inability to substitute consumption of oil products are also factors for 
suppliers to exhort higher prices on consumers. Moreover, it is very likely that the 
lack of fair competition has allowed all oil companies to collude to set higher 
prices simultaneously in order to keep their profit margins as high as possible. 
Indeed even as world prices of crude oil continue to fall, suppliers have 
maintained the old prices when the barrel of oil was trading at US$ 150 dollars. 
Evidently, the retail prices of gasoline and diesel have reached 2,563 and 2,350 
Uganda Shillings per litre, respectively for the first quarter of 2008 compared with 
1,763 and 1,513 per litre in 2004, nearly 50 per cent higher and there are no 4 
 
signs of the prices dropping even when the crude prices have plummeted to a 
third of their record levels. Even though the impacts of this hike seem to be 
evident, the Government has yet to genuinely look for alternative policies. The 
justification of the Government’s “laissez-fair” approach is the pronounced impact 
on tax revenue reduction, should it lower tariffs and taxes imposed on oil imports 
and consumption. Tax revenue from oil was about 535 Billion Uganda Shillings in 
2007, accounting for more than 19 per cent of total tax revenue.  
 
Because Uganda is landlocked, it depends largely on an oil pipeline from 
Mombasa to Eldoret, both in Kenya, from where products are trucked to 
Kampala. This has resulted in high import costs and uncertain in supply as is 
explained by the major fuel disruption that occurred at the end of 2007 in the 
aftermath of the Kenya’s post-election violence.  
 
Fig 1:  Uganda Imports of Oil, January-December, 2007 
 
 





































































B.2  The Oil Industry in Uganda 
 
 Uganda’s downstream oil sector was liberalized in 1994, and price controls and 
bureaucratic resource allocation were abolished and a new petroleum supply act 
was promulgated in October 2003. This led to the licensing of several 
companies, including several international oil companies like Shell, Total, and 
Caltex to take part in the industry. Although the sector is fairly competitive with 
even smaller firms operating, the market is dominated by the few international 
ones the top three being Shell, Total and Caltex (Ministry of Mineral and Energy 
Development 2008).  The persistently high prices of petroleum products in spite 
of the falls in the world crude prices have raised alarms in the population that the 
industry may be poorly regulated, making  players to collude to cheat the 
motorists. 
 
B.3  Energy Price Movements in Uganda
1 
Uganda’s fuel woes are closely linked to the recent power shortages that have 
increased the need for supplementary power to support the dwindling 
Hydroelectric Power (HEP) from the two dams in the country.  The recent 
prolonged drought in East Africa and the derelict power grid has caused a 
serious shortage of electricity, and this pressure on the power system prompted 
the government to encourage the entry of private firms to generate power from 
diesel operated thermal generators and supply it to the national grid.   
 
But in spite of this, power supply has lagged the power needs of the country  
resulting in a load-shedding program introduced in February 2006, that has often 
involved cutting power off for more than 12 hours every day to all consumers 
except certain key installations (such as hospitals). As of the end of 2006 the 
hydroelectric dams with an installed capacity of 356 MW were operating at less 
than one-half of the capacity, with the power generated being supplemented by a 
100 MW diesel-fired generators (Fig.2). This shortage is aggravated by the fact 
                                                 
1 Energy here refers to a combination of fuel for automobiles, manufacturing, etc and electricity  6 
 
that some of the generated electricity is exported to neighbouring countries. But 
with a dwindling generation capacity, the amount of power being exported has 
also been trending down, only that the country with such severe power shortages 
cannot afford to export any power (Fig. 3).
2 
 
Fig 2: Uganda Electricity Generation, 2000-2006 
 
Source: UBOS, 2007 
 
Fig 3: Uganda Electricity Exports, 2000-2007 
 
Source: UBOS, 2008 
 
                                                 



















































































































Inspite of the decreased exports of power, electricity prices have continiued to 
increase, mainly fueled by the incresese in the number of users that are coming 
onto the lectricity grid (Figures 4 and 5). 
 
Fig.4: Number of electricity domestic tariff consumers in Uganda, 2002 – 
2006 
 
Source: UBOS, 2008 
 
































Fig.5: Uganda Power Tariff Rates, 2002 to 2006 (UGX/kWh) 
 
Source: UBOS, 2008 
 
In order to support the endeavour to solve the acute power shortage in the 
country through the encouragement of thermal power generation, the 
government agreed in February 2006 to waive taxes on diesel used by 
commercial generators above a certain capacity. But in spite of that, these fuel 
guzzling measures have adversely aggravated the fuel price hikes, as the 
country becomes more dependent on diesel powered thermal power, leaving 
Uganda with one of the most expensive fuel in Africa.  
 
The other reason the price of fuel is high is the problematic supply from Kenya 
that has frequently caused supply shortages and, at times, rationing by fuel 
suppliers. This is mainly caused by inadequate pumping capacity of the pipeline 
to Eldoret that could not cope with the growing fuel demand in the countries in 
the hinterland that rely on Kenya for supply.  This has been aggravated by acts of 
vandalism that have often damaged the pipeline in order to steal petroleum 






































This together with relatively high excise duties and VAT on petroleum products 
has ensured that the mark-up on import oil is very high.  The tax on petroleum 
products accounts for a large share of total government revenue, amounting to 
about19.4 per cent of the total revenue (Ministry of Mineral and Energy 
Development 2008).   The VAT rate is now 18 per cent, and excise duties on 
gasoline were USh. 850 for a retail price of about Ushs 2650, and on diesel USh 
530 per litre, for a retail price of about UShs. 2450, which accounts for up to 33 
per cent of the final sale price.  Added to import duties, the tax rate on fuel is 
estimated at over 80 per cent. These high taxes levied on petroleum products 
combined with the impacts of high transportation costs makes fuel prices in 
Uganda one of the highest in Africa (Tables 1).  
 
Although the amount of petroleum products being imported into the country have 
continued to increase, and the world crude prices to plummet, local pump prices 
have continued to increase rising from Shs. 1095 per litre of diesel in January 
2000 to Shs. 2,350 in May 2008. Petrol similarly rose from Shs 1305 per litre to 
Shs. 2650 during the same period (Figures 6 and 7). 
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Fig. 6: Sales of selected Petroleum Products in Uganda 2002 - 2006 
 
 
Fig. 7: Average Pump Prices for Petroleum Products in Uganda (Kampala 
Pump Prices, Shillings per Litre, January 2007-May 2008) 
 





























































































































































































































Petrol  Diesel Kerosene11 
 
Table 1: Retail Regular Petrol and Diesel Prices per Litre for Selected 
Countries in US$ (April 2006) 
Country Price(US$) 
 Petrol  Diesel 
Uganda 1.20  1.07 
Rwanda 1.10  1.08 
Kenya 1.04  0.88 
Tanzania 1.03  1.03 
Ghana 0.85  0.78 
Ethiopia 0.63  0.50 
Egypt 0.17  0.10 
USA 0.73 0.72 
Source: Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP), World 
Bank 
 
The high fuel prices have led to inflationary pressures as indicated in Figure 5.  
Fig. 8: Annual Inflation (%) and Average Monthly Prices of Petrol and Diesel 
(‘00 Ushs.) January 2007-May 2008 
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B.4   Expected Impact of the Discovery of Oil in Uganda 
Uganda recently discovered some potentially commercially viable quantities of oil 
in the western and northern parts of the country. The exploration work is being 
undertaken by mainly four firms, namely Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd, Tullow Oil, 
Dominion Petroleum and Tower Resources, UK.  Most of the oil discoveries have 
been in the Albertine Graben Basin and so far 21 wells have been drilled in this 
basin of which more than 10 have come up with oil discoveries. As of the end of 
2008, more than US $ 500 million had already been invested in the exploration of 
oil and gas. The discoveries so far made, indicate that Uganda’s oil reserves may 
be more than 1 billion barrels of oil, with other opportunities for exploration yet to 
be tried. Estimates point to a possibility of the country annually receiving up to 
US$ 5 billion from oil exports when the oil production becomes fully operational. 
 
To help speed up the relief to the over burdened energy sector, the government 
is working with Tullow Oil on what they are calling an early production scheme 
that will initially use more than 4,000 barrels of oil per day to produce diesel, 
Kerosene and Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). It is expected that the production especially 
of the HFO that is cheaper to use in thermal generation than the diesel that is 
being used now, will help not only to reduce the amount of oil imports but also 
the price of electricity. It is expected that by the end of 2009, under the early 
production scheme, 50-85 MW of power will be generated using HFO, something 
that will relive the shortages in the power sector.
3 At the moment it is not yet clear 
how much revenue the country may eventually get from oil and it is therefore 
difficult to ascertain how much impact it will have on the energy sector. But what 
is clear is that if the production starts in earnest and as long as the proceeds are 
managed well, this is bound to have a significant positive impact on the energy 
sector through possibly cheaper fuel or reduced reliance on expensive diesel for 
thermal power generation. 
  
                                                 
3 It must be understood however, that all these plans are still at proposal form and that the early production scheme may 
delay due to environment and economic reasons, including the continuous fall in global crude prices that may make the 
Ugandan oil industry unprofitable. 13 
 
C.  Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to assess the impact of the high energy prices 
and reduced electricity generation on the Uganda economy especially on the 
manufacturing sector. The study seeks to investigate how the recent increases in 
the prices of energy and the low generation of electricity have affected the overall 
macro-economy, different sectors of the economy and the welfare of different 
sections of the population. 
 
D.  Justification of the Study 
Whereas it is taken for granted that high energy prices have a detrimental impact 
on economies of oil importing countries like Uganda, there is a paucity of studies 
that have gone ahead to empirically prove this for Uganda. One of the reasons 
for this is because high energy prices have only recently become a global threat 
to economic growth. This has necessitated that the impact of these oil shocks be 
investigated to provide policy makers with evidence of efficacy of the energy 
policies that they are undertaking and how they affect both the economy and the 
welfare of the population. Although the Energy Sector Management Assistance 
Programme (ESMAP) of the World Bank has routinely been assessing the impact 
of energy prices on the world economies, it has been using only descriptive 
assessment without rigorous empirical assessment (See for Example, Bacon and 
Kojima, 2006; Bacon, R., and Mattar, A., 2005).  Moreover, we do not know of 
any study that has empirically studied the impact of an increase in the price of 
both petroleum and electric power in Uganda. Based on an economy-wide 
extensive SAM which was recently released by the Uganda National Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS), based on 2007 data, our CGE analysis  empirically assesses 
the macroeconomic and welfare impacts of high energy prices in Uganda.  
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E. Literature  Review 
The impact of the high energy prices on the economy both at the macro and 
micro level is well documented in many studies. Not only does it affect the firms’ 
activities but it also generally impact negatively on the whole economy.  Lee and 
Ni, 2002 found that for industries that have a large cost share of oil, such as 
petroleum refinery and industrial chemicals, oil price shocks mainly reduce 
supply but for other industries, with the automobile industry being a particularly 
important example, oil price shocks mainly reduce demand, suggesting that oil 
price shocks influence economic activities beyond that explained by direct input 
cost effects, possibly by delaying purchasing decisions of durable goods.  
 
Schneider, 2004 also found that oil price shocks affect the economy through the 
supply side (higher production costs, reallocation of resources), the demand side 
(income effects, uncertainties) and the terms of trade. The paper also found that 
an increase in the price of oil feeds through to GDP growth to a much larger 
extent than a decline, a phenomenon that can be attributed to adjustment costs 
associated with sectoral reallocations, the implications of uncertainties for 
spending on consumer durables and investment, and nominal wage rigidities. 
Furthermore, the element of surprise in oil price hikes seems to play a 
considerable role. Thus, the paper continues, when a rise in the price of oil 
occurs after a prolonged period of oil price stability, it has a larger impact than a 
price hike which immediately follows previous cuts. 
 
To emphasize the importance of oil in the economic health of even developed 
countries, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2005 contend that every U.S. recession since 
1971 has been preceded by two things: an oil price shock and an increase in the 
federal funds rate.  
 
Abeysinghe, 2001 measuring the direct and indirect effects of oil prices on GDP 
growth of 12 economies, finds that that the transmission effect of oil prices on 
growth may not be that important for a large economy like the US but it could 15 
 
play a critical role in small open economies with the biggest impact being the 
effect of the shock and its interaction with consumer and investor confidence. 
 
Using a GEM-E3 world model to carry out a comparative statics analysis of the 
potential impact of oil price rises on the EU economy, Ciscar., et. al, 2004, found 
out that crude petroleum, petroleum refineries and energy-intensive sectors 
undergo a significant fall in their value-added with almost 40 per cent of the 
overall GDP fall coming from other service sector, while the trade and transport 
sector and the other equipment goods sector represent each approximately 10 
per cent of the overall GDP fall. They found that the GDP losses for the EU as a 
whole were 0.94 per cent in a scenario where oil was increased by $10 and 2.56 
per cent in the second where the oil was increased by $30. Whereas they found 
that the macroeconomic impact is slightly lower in the USA (0.81 per cent and 
2.21 per cent, respectively), Australia, the FSU, India and Japan had similar 
losses to that of the whole EU, while China and Africa experienced a bigger GDP 
drop. Taking the African case it seems to suggest that the pass-through effects of 
increased oil prices is particularly more harmful to African countries like Uganda.  
 
Pradhan, and Sahoo, 2000, using CGE to analyse the impact of international oil 
price shock on the Indian economy found that it affects the welfare and poverty of 
households directly as well as indirectly. The paper found that oil shock leads to 
decline in household welfare and increase in poverty and that with the increase in 
elasticity of substitution of demand for imports to domestically produced crude oil, 
welfare loss for household groups goes on increasing. The paper found that the rise 
in rural poverty is concentrated among non-agricultural labour and other household 
groups, while that for urban area is reflected in non-agricultural household group.   
 
Other researchers who have used CGE to study the impact on the economy of high 
oil prices are Adenikinju and Falobi, 2006 who find that the oil sector supply 
shocks in Nigeria are costly both directly and indirectly resulting in lower real 
GDP, higher average prices and greater balance of payment deficits. They also 16 
 
find that other macroeconomic variables such as private consumption, 
investment, government revenue and employment also decline. In addition, they 
find that the distributional impact of the quantitative energy supply shocks is 
higher for poor households than rich households.  
 
Nkomo, 2006 contend that in Southern African countries, energy shocks affect 
the economies because energy consumers and producers are constrained by 
their energy consuming appliances which are fixed in the short-run, thus making 
it difficult to shift to less oil intensive means of production in response to higher 
oil prices and thus oil price shocks increase the total import bill for a country 
largely because of the huge increase in the cost of oil and petroleum products 
that low-income countries with poorer households tending to suffer the largest 
impact from oil price rise. 
 
The Provincial Decision-Making Enabling (PROVIDE) Project , 2005 using CGE 
to analyse the impact of an oil price increase in South Africa find that a 20 per 
cent oil shock to the economy results in a drop in GDP of 1 per cent. The paper 
finds that the major impact is to be found in the petroleum industry itself, whereas 
the effects on liquid fuel dependent industries such as transport are not as large 
as may be supposed.  In agriculture, they find that the depreciating currency has 
a positive effect, offsetting most of the negative effects of higher petroleum 
prices, particularly in export-oriented areas. 
 
Apart from oil or fuel prices, electricity shortage is as destructive, as found out by 
Guha, G. S, 2005. Using a CGE model to assess the economic impact of 
electricity outages arising from natural disasters in Memphis, Tennessee, the 
paper found that outages cause downstream effects (where customers are short-
supplied), upstream effects (where suppliers are affected by cancelled orders), 
inflation effects (high cost of critical input), income effect (wage cuts lead to 
reduced spending and lower demand) and investment effect (lower surpluses). 
 17 
 
F.  The Uganda Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 2007 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a table which summarizes the economic 
activities of all agents in the economy. These agents typically include 
households, enterprises, government, and the rest of the world (ROW). The 
relationships included in the SAM include purchase of inputs (goods and 
services, imports, labour, land, capital etc.); production of commodities; payment 
of wages, interest rent and taxes; and savings and investment. Like other 
conventional SAMs, the Uganda SAM is based on a block of production 
activities, involving factors of production, households, government, stocks and 
the rest of the world.   
 
The Uganda SAM is a 120 by 120 matrix.  The various commodities (domestic 
production) supplied are purchased and used by households for final 
consumption (42 per cent of the total), but also a considerable proportion (34 per 
cent) is demanded and used by producers as intermediate inputs. Only 7 percent 
of domestic production is exported, while 11 per cent is used for investment and 
stocks and the remaining 7 percent is used by government for final consumption. 
Households derive 64 per cent of their income from factor income payments, 
while the rest accrues from government, inter-household transfers, corporations 
and the rest of the world. The government earns 32 percent of its income from 
import tariffs – a relatively high proportion, but a characteristic typical of 
developing countries. It derives 42 percent of its income from the ROW, which 
includes international aid and interest. The remainder of government’s income is 
derived from taxes on products (14 percent), income taxes paid by households (6 
percent) and corporate taxes (5 percent).  
 
Investment finance is sourced more or less equally from government (26 per 
cent), domestic producers (27 per cent) and households (26 per cent), with 
enterprises providing only 21 per cent.  Imports of goods and services account 
for 87 percent of total expenditure to the ROW. The rest is paid to ROW by 
domestic household sectors in form of remittances; wage labour from domestic 18 
 
production activity; domestic corporations payments of dividends; income 
transfers paid by government; and net lending and external debt related 
payments.  
 
The extent of household dis-aggregation is very important for policy analysis, and 
involves representative household groups as opposed to individual households. 
Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) argue persuasively for a household dis-aggregation 
that minimizes within-group heterogeneity. This is achieved in the Uganda SAM 
through the disaggregating of households by rural and urban, and whether 
households are involved in farming or non farming activities. 
 
The Uganda SAM identifies three labour categories disaggregated by skilled, 
unskilled and self employed. Land and capital are distributed accordingly to the 
various household groups. 
 
G.  Salient Features of the CGE Model 
The CGE model used in the present study is based on a standard CGE model 
developed by Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). This is a real model without 
the financial or banking system (See Table A1). It cannot be used to forecast 
inflation. The CGE model is calibrated to the 2007 SAM. GAMS software is used 
to calibrate the model and perform the simulations. 
 
Productions and commodities 
For all activities, producers maximize profits given their technology and the prices 
of inputs and output. The production technology is a two-step nested structure. At 
the bottom level, primary inputs are combined to produce value-added using a 
CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function. At the top level, aggregated 
value added is then combined with intermediate input within a fixed coefficient 
(Leontief) function to give the output. The profit maximization gives the demand 
for intermediate goods, labour and capital demand. The detailed disaggregation 19 
 
of production activities captures the changing structure of growth due to the 
pandemic. 
 
The allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is 
determined using the assumption that domestic producers maximize profits 
subject to imperfect transformability between these two alternatives. The 
production possibility frontier of the economy is defined by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function between domestic supply and export. 
On the demand side, a composite commodity is made up of domestic demand 
and final imports and it is consumed by households, enterprises, and 
government. The Armington assumption is used here to distinguish between 
domestically produced goods and imports. For each good, the model assumes 
imperfect substitutability (CES function) between imports and the corresponding 
composite domestic goods. The parameter for CET and CES elasticity used to 
calibrate the functions used in the CGE model are exogenously determined.  
 
Factor of production 
There are 6 primary inputs: 3 labour types, capital, cattle and land. Wages and 
returns to capital are assumed to adjust so as to clear all the factor markets. 
Unskilled and self-employed labor is mobile across sectors while capital is 
assumed to be sector-specific. 
 
Institutions 
There are three institutions in the model:, households, enterprises and 
government. Households receive their income from primary factor payments. 
They also receive transfers from government and the rest of the world. 
Households pay income taxes and these are proportional to their incomes. 
Savings and total consumption are assumed to be a fixed proportion of 
household’s disposable income (income after income taxes). Consumption 
demand is determined by a Linear Expenditure System (LES) function. Firms 
receive their income from remuneration of capital; transfers from government and 20 
 
the rest of the world; and net capital transfers from households. Firms pay 
corporate tax to government and these are proportional to their incomes. 
Government revenue is composed of direct taxes collected from households and 
firms, indirect taxes on domestic activities, domestic value added tax, tariff 
revenue on imports, factor income to the government, and transfers from the rest 
of the world. The government also saves and consumes. 
 
Macro closure 
Equilibrium in a CGE model is captured by a set of macro closures in a model. 
Aside from the supply-demand balances in product and factor markets, three 
macroeconomic balances are specified in the model: (i) fiscal balance, (ii) the 
external trade balance, and (iii) savings-investment balance. For fiscal balance, 
government savings is assumed to adjust to equate the different between 
government revenue and spending. For external balance, foreign savings are 
fixed with exchange rate adjustment to clear foreign exchange markets. For 
savings-investment balance, the model assumes that savings are investment 
driven and adjust through flexible saving rate for firms. Alternative closures, 
described later, are used in a subset of the model simulations. 
 
Recursive Dynamics 
To appropriately capture the dynamic aspects of aid on the economy, this model 
is extended by building some recursive dynamics by adopting the methodology 
used in previous studies on Botswana and South Africa (Thurlow, 2007). The 
dynamics is captured by assuming that investments in the current period are 
used to build on the new capital stock for the next period. The new capital is 
allocated across sectors according to the profitability of the various sectors. The 
labour supply path under different policy scenarios is exogenously provided from 
a demographic model. The model is initially solved to replicate the SAM of 2007. 
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H. Simulation  Results 
This section undertakes several simulations to understand the direct and indirect 
effects of oil price changes and shortages in electricity generation on the 
economy. First, we run a simulation where we assume that the oil price increase 
is permanent. We then run another simulation where we assume that prices of oil 
increase are temporary reverting back to their earlier prices. This simulation 
would capture the actual trend that has recently been observed, where prices 
increased to US$150 dollars and are now back to US$50 dollars per barrel. The 
third simulation looks at the declining productivity of the electricity sector that has 
resulted into shortages of electricity. In this simulation we assume a status quo 
where nothing is done by the government. The fourth simulation is where we 
assume that the government attracts investments into the energy sector so as to 
revamp the generation of electricity. The fifth simulation considers a case where 
the government reduces its tariffs on oil products to circumvent the price 
increases and the effect on the rest of the economy. This simulation is run 
simultaneously assuming that oil prices have increased either on a permanent or 
temporary basis. 
 
H.1  Permanent Oil Price Increase 
We start with a permanent increase in prices of oil. While this is a hypothetical 
scenario, it indeed reflects the current situation in Uganda given that albeit the 
decline in world prices of crude oil, the suppliers have deliberately kept the prices 
at the same levels and in some cases even higher than when international prices 
were on the rise.  
 
From a macro perspective, an increase in prices of oil would affect the economy 
through various channels. First, being that oil is such an important item in the 
consumers basket, the first immediate impact is the pressure it puts on domestic 
prices. The higher price of oil imports pushes the consumer price index (CPI) up 
by 7 percentage points above its pre-shock level. With the real consumption 
wage assumed fixed, the nominal wage must move with CPI. Thus, average 22 
 
nominal wages increase by 7 per cent. However, producers can raise their prices 
by only 1 per cent (GDP deflator at factor cost) compared with a 7 per cent hike 
in nominal wages causing producer real wages to rise. As a result, the demand 
for labour decreases leading to more than a 1 per cent reduction in aggregate 
employment.  
 
On the demand side of the economy, we also notice that total absorption reduces 
by 2 per cent mainly due to the decline in private consumption which declines by 
3 per cent. In addition, private investments also grow at a slower rate given the 
overall reduction in income levels as will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections. Overall, the private savings would decline by 1 per cent of GDP every 
year. Notwithstanding the negative effects on private consumption and 
investments, the government benefits significantly as its import duties increases 
by 1 per cent on an annual basis.  
 
The surge in prices could also put more pressure on the exchange rate as the 
country would be faced with a higher import bill that requires more foreign 
exchange. This would result into the depreciation of the currency by 5.2 per cent. 
The depreciation could indeed be a welcome development especially for 
exporters. Indeed we find that exports are boosted by 3 per cent on annual basis 
during the period 2008-2012.  
 
There are two main issues regarding the impacts of the increase in oil price. 
First, how significant is the increase for the cost of a particular industry as a 
result of higher prices of oil. Second, how the output of each industry responds to 





BASE OILPERM OILTEMP ELECPERM ELECTEMP OILECPERM OILECTEMP OILTAX
Overall GDP 5.43
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INITIAL BASE OILPERM OILTEMP ELECPERM ELECTEMP OILECPERM OILECTEMP OILTAX 
Absorption 26446 5.0 -1.5 3.1 4.9 4.9 -1.6 3.0 -1.8
Consumption 18743 5.5 -3.1 2.3 5.4 5.5 -3.2 2.2 -1.8
Investment  5014 3.9 1.6 5.9 3.9 3.9 1.5 5.9 -4.5
Exports  2689 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Imports 3335 9.2 18.8 15.5 9.1 9.1 18.8 15.4 21.5 
Real exchange rate 9190 5.5 5.2 4.4 5.5 5.5 5.2 4.4 2.9
Nominal exchange rate 66  -1.0 21.8 4.0 -1.1 -1.0 21.8 3.9 23.2 
Industrial Production Price 151 -0.1 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.2 0.6
CPI 100 -0.1 7.1 2.6 -0.1 -0.1 7.1 2.6 5.9
Investment to GDP  22  -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -1.2
Private Savings to GDP 8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Foreign Savings to GDP 10  -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.2
Trade Deficit to GDP  25  -0.7 1.9 0.3 -0.7 -0.7 1.9 0.3 0.4
Government Savings to GDP 5 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -1.4
Import duties to GDP 5 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.7 -0.3
Direct Taxes to GDP 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4: Macroeconomic Developments under Various Energy Shortages
(Average Growth 2008-2016)25 
 
For the case of Uganda, overall we do not see a noticeable change in total GDP. 
This is partly because there would be a reallocation of resources between the 
sectors with a major boost to trade (which is part of services). However, a detailed 
look at the sectoral level reveals a lot more. For instance, for the case of 
manufacturing, there would be a total reduction in output of 7 per cent during the 
period 2008-12. This output loss is witnessed amongst all the subcategories 
including both the agro-processing and non-agro-processing industries. There are 
several explanations for this. First, the manufacturing sector relies a lot on transport 
so this becomes an increased cost in the process of production. Second, a lot of 
factories are now relying on generators owing to the frequent power outages.  
 
Also of interest is that the agricultural sector is also affected. The total output loss 
due to the permanent price increase is estimated at 0.3 per cent of GDP over the 
period 2008-12. Agriculture depends a lot on the transportation sector especially 
while transporting goods to the intended markets. However, within agriculture, we 
find that the horticulture industry is most affected owing to the heavy use of 
generators for this industry. Also, the heavy use of transport and generators is 




The overall impact on services is positive. However, it’s important again to scrutinize 
the individual sectors in services. Transport which is so dependent on oil is the worst 
affected. Overall we notice that the output of transport would decline by 30 per cent. 
This is substantial given that there are so many other sectors that are dependent on 
the transportation sector. On the other hand, trade would be significantly boosted as 
a result of the fluctuations in oil prices. Indeed for the case of Uganda, this is 
evidenced by the high number of petrol stations being opened.  
 
                                                 
4 The increase in production costs due to high oil prices, high electricity tariffs and reduction of stocks of fish in Lake Victoria 
partly explains the recent bankruptcies and closure of several fish factories. 26 
 
Fig. 9: Oil Price Shock and Agriculture Growth 
 
 




























Fig. 11: Oil Price Shock and Private Services Growth 
 
 



























Fig. 13: Oil Price Shock and Transport Growth 
 
 
In summary, a permanent increase in oil prices would put more pressure on 
domestic prices and the exchange rate. Higher oil prices would also result into 
significant reductions of output especially for the manufacturing, agriculture and 
transportation sector which are so much dependent on oil. At the macro level, higher 
prices would also lower private investments and due to lower incomes and output 
this would reduce the levels of investments. On positive note, higher oil prices would 
result into high import duties and thereby contribute to the reduction in the deficit.
5  
 
H.2  Temporary Price Increase 
We now consider the case where prices increase but later drop back to their earlier 
levels. This simulation reflects what would be considered the actual patterns in the 
international movement of prices. We therefore consider a case where prices first 
                                                 
5 An increase in import duties due to higher world prices could however create laxity to improve on 


















increase by 50 per cent during 2008 and in the subsequent years start falling back to 
the original levels. 
 
From a macro perspective, the effects of a temporary increase in oil prices are very 
different from the permanent case scenario. In general, the effects would not be as 
negative compared to the earlier results. The CPI would only increase during the 
year we witness a price surge, but prices would ten normalize back to the original 
levels.  
 
On the demand side of the economy, total absorption is much higher than for the 
permanent increase but still lower than the baseline where prices do not change at 
all. The change in total absorption is a reflection of the reduction in private 
consumption during the year when prices increase significantly. The pressure that is 
put on the exchange rate is also less with the currency only depreciating by 5 per 
cent per year.  
 
The overall impact of a temporary increase in prices of oil also depends so much on 
the sector in question.  For the case of manufacturing, there would be a total 
reduction in output of 2.2 per cent during the period 2008-12. This is much lower 
output loss to the economy compared to the previous scenario. This output loss is 
also witnessed amongst all the subcategories including both the agro-processing 
and non agro-processing industries. Likewise transport which is so dependent on oil 
would be negatively affected but the effect would be subdued.   
 
This simulation reveals that the government should indeed intervene with the traders 
of oil products in Uganda in the event that it’s the case that they manipulate prices. 
Indeed, there is considerable output to be gained if prices were being adjusted in 
line with international crude oil prices. While there could be other reasons why prices 
have remained high, government should come up with a clear policy on price of oil 
vis-à-vis the international prices.  
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H.3  Permanent Reduction in Productivity of the Electricity Sector 
We now consider the case where productivity in the electricity sector has declined 
significantly. The permanent deterioration of the sector presumes that that are no 
additional investments in the sector especially in upgrading and addition of 
generation capacity. The objective of this simulation is to assess the extent to which 
this sector is important to other sectors especially manufacturing. The permanent 
reduction in productivity of the sector presumably portrays the current inefficiency 
levels of the sector where there is considerable load shedding and high prices of 
tariffs owing to the fact that the country now largely depends on thermal generators 
which tend to be more expensive. 
 
At the aggregate level, we find that Uganda looses about 0.1 per cent of GDP on 
annual basis due to the inefficiency in the energy sector. The losses are more 
pronounced in the sectors which depend a lot on electricity. Of particular interest is 
the manufacturing sector. For industries, there are two channels through which they 
get affected. First, the energy losses due to poor transmission and other 
innefffciencies affect the productivity of these factories. Second, when they resort to 
use of generators, this significantly increases their production cost. The sector 
looses about 0.1 per cent in production as a result of inefficiencies in the electricity 
sector. On a cumulative basis, this would translate into lost production of 5 per cent 
over the period 2008-12.  
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Fig. 14: Electricity Shortage and Agricultural Growth 
 
 































Fig. 16: Electricity and Utilities Growth 
 
 
H.4   Increased Investment in the Energy Sector 
We now consider a case where the government and private sector mobilizes 
resources to revamp the sector. To a certain extent this simulation portrays what is 
currently happening. The government is currently putting up several dams to 
increase the capacity of electricity generated from 416 to 666 MW. In partnership 
with the Aghakan Foundation, the government is constructing a new dam at Bajagali 
falls which will add an additional 250 MW of power to the national grid. This will also 
enable thermal generators which are too costly to be phased out over time. It’s 
presumed that in addition to the increase of power generated, this will improve the 
efficiency of the energy sector. For purposes of the simulation, we assume that the 
productivity of the sector will improve by 2 per cent. 
 
As a result of the additional investments in the energy sector, this would result into 
















inefficient, the country can recover more than 5 per cent growth in GDP over the 
period 2009-2012. The recovery would mainly come from the sector itself and other 
sectors that use electricity as an intermediate input. The specific sectors like 
manufacturing would also be able to produce at a higher rate. This shows that there 
is a lot to gain when more investments are tailored to the sector.  
 
H.5  Removal of Tariffs on Oil Commodities 
From a policy perspective, the government could circumvent the increase in the oil 
prices by reducing the tariffs. However, before ascertaining whether this is the ideal 
option, we need to understand the impact of an oil shock on the demand. First, an oil 
price increase could potentially result into a decline in total demand for oil products. 
On the other hand there would be a value increase owing to the nominal price 
change.  Therefore, while there would be an increase in the price the quantity 
demanded could actually drop resulting into an overall decline in value. Hence the 
reduction in tariff could indeed reduce the domestic price level which would stimulate 
further demand for oil.  
 
From the simulation, we reduce tariffs by 50 per cent. This has several 
macroeconomic consequences. First, there is a direct loss in tariff revenues which 
results into a higher deficit. By running higher deficits which would require financing 
by the government results into crowding out of resources and reduces private 
investments by 1 per cent on an annual basis.  However, this policy would 
circumvent some of the output losses at a sectoral level only in the short run. For 
instance the losses in agriculture and industry are less than when government does 
nothing. The benefits are short-lived though owing to the fact that the high deficits 
run by the central government would catch up with the private sector. From the 
consumption side, the households would also temporarily benefit in the year when 
the tariff reduction is implemented. 
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H.6 Poverty and High Energy Prices  
We now examine the extent to which high energy prices affect households. At a 
national level, we observe that high energy prices indeed increase poverty. Whether 
these shocks are on a permanent or temporary basis, there is a marked increase in 
poverty levels. For the case where the increase is temporary, we observe that 
poverty at a national level would increase by 2 per cent during the year when the 
shock occurs. The increase in poverty is across the board whether the household is 
based in the rural or urban area. The intuition behind the increase is owing to the 
reduced incomes as most sectors particularly agriculture and manufacturing are 
negatively affected by the oil price shock. 
 

















































Fig. 18: Impact of High Energy Prices on Rural Poverty Rates for the Year 2012 
 
 
Fig. 19: Impact of High Energy Prices on Urban Poverty Rates for the Year 
2012 
 
For the electricity reduction in generation, the impact on poverty is rather small. This 
is due to the fact that technologies used by the agricultural sector are not so much 
dependent on electricity. Since the sector employs 70 per cent of the households 





















































































Table.5: Poverty Indices under Various Scenarios 
 
 
I.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This chapter demonstrates that high energy prices have cost Uganda dearly in terms 
of output for some sectors. While at the aggregate level, GDP might not be affected 
as more activity is realised in the trading sector, increase in oil prices would 
significantly reduce the output for agriculture, manufacturing and transports. The 
reduction in output for these sectors is subdued when the oil price shock is 
temporary. On the other hand, the low efficiency in the electricity sector has also 
negatively affected the sectors. The combined effects of oil price shocks and 
reduction in electricity generated would reduce overall growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector by 2 percentage points on annual basis.  
 
From the policy perspective, the government would have to make choices on the 
tariff regime for oil imports.  First, at a time of high oil prices, the government can 
intervene by lowering tariffs in oil products. However, this has to take into account 
the trade-off between the oil tariff revenues and taxes lost owing to reduced 
BASE OILPERM  OILTEMP ELECPERM ELECTEMP OILECPERM  OILECTEMP OILTAX
2007 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14  31.14 31.14
2008 29.89 32.42 32.42 29.93 29.93 32.43  32.43 31.59
2009 28.58 34.85 33.96 28.67 28.67 34.87  34.12 32.67
2010 27.17 38.80 36.38 27.28 27.28 38.83  36.48 35.29
2011 25.95 44.06 34.89 26.05 26.02 44.13  34.91 39.77
2012 24.90 49.27 33.15 25.01 24.94 49.33  33.29 45.34
2007 34.29 34.29 34.29 34.29 34.29 34.29  34.29 34.29
2008 33.02 35.57 35.57 33.07 33.07 35.57  35.57 34.68
2009 31.55 38.18 37.21 31.65 31.65 38.19  37.39 35.83
2010 29.98 42.26 39.77 30.10 30.10 42.30  39.85 38.62
2011 28.62 47.59 38.19 28.72 28.71 47.68  38.22 43.22
2012 27.53 53.05 36.31 27.63 27.55 53.10  36.47 48.92
2007 13.77 13.77 13.77 13.77 13.77 13.77  13.77 13.77
2008 12.61 15.09 15.09 12.61 12.61 15.11  15.11 14.53
2009 12.23 16.53 16.04 12.23 12.23 16.53  16.13 15.27
2010 11.73 19.73 17.74 11.73 11.73 19.73  17.92 16.92
2011 11.23 24.59 16.69 11.33 11.23 24.59  16.69 20.77
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economic activity especially in the manufacturing sector. Second, the government 
should take a more active role on suppliers to ensure that prices are adjusted 
downwards when international prices drop. Whereas it is possible that lack of quick 
transmission of lower prices at the international level to the domestic market may be 
due to the physical bottlenecks alluded to in section B3, the inability of the players in 
the industry to reduce prices after months of a drop in international crude prices 
point more to an institutional problem that may be under the control of the 
government to address. As found, the output losses are much higher when the price 
increase remains permanent. Third, without addressing the inefficiencies in the 
electricity sector, this will continue affecting the output of manufacturing and other 
sectors that depend on electricity. More private-public investments should be 
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Table A1. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Sets      
  Activities    Commodities not in 
CM 
Activities with a Leontief 
function at the top of the 
technology nest 
  Transaction service 
commodities 






domestic sales of 
domestic output 
  Factors 
  Commodities not in CD   
Institutions 
(domestic and rest 
of world) 
  Exported commodities     Domestic 
institutions 








  Households 
Parameters      
  Weight of commodity c 
in the CPI 
  Quantity of stock 
change 
 
Weight of commodity c 







Quantity of c as 
intermediate input per 






Quantity of commodity c 
as trade input per unit of 
c’ produced and sold 
domestically 
 
Share for domestic 
institution i in 
income of factor f 
 
Quantity of commodity c 
as trade input per 
exported unit of c’ 
 
Share of net 
income of i’ to i (i’ ∈ 
INSDNG’; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
 
Quantity of commodity c 
as trade input per 
imported unit of c’  
  Tax rate for activity 
a 
aA ∈ () cC M N C ∈ ⊂
() aA L E O A ∈⊂ () cC T C ∈ ⊂
cC ∈ () cC X C ∈ ⊂
() cC D C ∈⊂ f F ∈
() cC D N C ∈⊂ iI N S ∈
() cC E C ∈⊂ () i INSD INS ∈ ⊂
() cC E N C ∈⊂ () i INSDNG INSD ∈ ⊂
() hH I N S D N G ∈ ⊂
c cwts c qdst
c dwts c qg
ca ica
c qinv
' cc icd if shif
' cc ice ' ii shii
' cc icm a ta41 
 
 
Quantity of aggregate 








Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per 
activity unit 
 
0-1 parameter with 
1 for institutions 
with potentially 
flexed direct tax 
rates 
  Base savings rate for 
domestic institution i 
  Import tariff rate 
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
   Rate of sales tax 
  Export price (foreign 
currency) 
  Transfer from factor 
f to institution i 
  Import price (foreign 
currency)    
a inta i tins
a iva i tins01
i mps c tm
i mps01 c tq
c pwe   if trnsfr
c pwm42 
 
Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Greek Symbols     
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES activity function 
t
cr δ   CET function share 
parameter 
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES value-added function 
 
CES value-added function 
share parameter for factor f 
in activity a 
 




Subsistence consumption of 
marketed commodity c for 
household h 
  Armington function shift 
parameter 
  Yield of output c per unit of 
activity a 
  CET function shift parameter         CES production function 
exponent 
a β  
Capital sectoral mobility 
factor 
  CES value-added function 
exponent 
 
Marginal share of 
consumption spending on 






  CES activity function share 
parameter 
  Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for 
domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
  CET function exponent 
q
cr δ   Armington function share 
parameter 
a
fat η   Sector share of new capital 
f υ   Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables     
  Consumer price index    
Savings rate scaling factor (= 
0 for base) 
 
Change in domestic 
institution tax share  (= 0 for 
base; exogenous variable) 
  Quantity supplied of factor 
   Foreign savings (FCU)   
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 





Wage distortion factor for 
factor f in activity a 
  Investment adjustment factor     
Endogenous Variables     
a
ft AWF  
Average capital rental rate in 
time period t 
  Government consumption 
demand for commodity 





































DMPS ch QH43 
 
institution savings rates (= 0 
for base; exogenous 
variable) 
commodity c by household h 
 
Producer price index for 
domestically marketed output
 
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c 
from activity a for household 
h 
  Government expenditures    Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input 
  Consumption spending for 
household 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity 
a 
 
Exchange rate (LCU  per unit 
of FCU) 
  Quantity of investment 
demand for commodity 
  Government savings  cr QM   Quantity of imports of 
commodity c 
  Quantity demanded of factor 
f from activity a    
 
Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued     
 
Marginal propensity to 




Quantity of goods 
supplied to domestic 
market (composite 
supply) 
  Activity price (unit gross 
revenue) 
  
Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade 
input 
 
Demand price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
  Quantity of (aggregate) 
value-added 
 
Supply price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
 
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of 
commodity 
cr PE   Export price (domestic 
currency) 
  
Quantity of output of 
commodity c from 
activity a 
  Aggregate intermediate 
input price for activity a 
f RWF   Real average factor 
price 
ft PK  
Unit price of capital in 
time period t     Total nominal 
absorption 
cr PM   Import price (domestic 
currency) 
 
Direct tax rate for 








i MPS c QQ
a PA c QT
c PDD a QVA










institution i’ to i (both in 
the set INSDNG) 
 
Value-added price 
(factor income per unit 
of activity) 
  Average price of factor 
  Aggregate producer 
price for commodity 
  Income of factor f 
 
Producer price of 
commodity c for activity 
a 
  Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of 
activity 
 







  Income to domestic 
institution i from factor f
cr QE   Quantity of exports 
a
fat K Δ  
Quantity of new capital 
by activity a for time 
period t 
 
c PQ ' ii TRII
a PVA f WF
c PX f YF
ac PXAC YG
a QA i YI
c QD if YIF45 
 
Table A2. CGE model equations 
Production and Price Equations 
   





=⋅ ∑   (2) 
()












=⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟






aa va vaf va vaf
fa f a a f af a f a f af a f a
fF







⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟


















⎝⎠ ∑   (5) 
1
1
' ' '' '' ' '
''
van van
fa fa van van
f f a f fa fa ff a f a ff a f a
fF






⋅= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑   (6) 
aa a QVA iva QA =⋅  (7) 
aa a QINTA inta QA =⋅   (8) 
(1 ) aa a a a a a PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   (9) 
ac ac a QXAC QA θ =⋅   (10)



























c a c c a ca c a ca c
aA






⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑   (13)
'
'
cr cr c c c
cC T
PE pwe EXR PQ ice
∈





cc r c r cc rc
rr





























Table A3. CGE model equations (continued) 
cc r c
r
 = QD QE QX +∑   (17)
c c c c cr cr
r
PX QX PDS QD PE QE ⋅= ⋅ + ⋅ ∑   (18)
''
'
cc c c c
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Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations 
   
fa f ff a
aA
YF  = WF   WFDIST QF
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Table A3. CGE Model Equations (continued) 
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